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Objective
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To support risk-informed decision making by understanding the issues involved  
when assessing risk by: 
• Correctly Assessing Risk 
– Identifying areas of concern in Design and Development of Complex Launch Vehicles
– Improving accuracy of risk values in the decision making process
– Providing justification for redesign of a system when risk is too great
• Validating Data Sources
– Identify issues relative to predicted and demonstrated data sources
– Evaluate the use of epistemic error factors for predicted data
– Calculate error factors for demonstrated data
• Performing Comparison of Risk Model Results
– Compare Predicted vs. Demonstrated data in risk models
– Comparison of uncertainty utilizing epistemic values vs. calculated values
• Identify Pitfalls and Precautions of using predicted failure data vs. 
demonstrated data when making the decision to accept risk.
Model Parameters
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• Model Development 
– Two models were developed for comparison utilizing the same components
– Each model represents a theroetical circuit which requires a two of two output for circuit 
functionality to be achieved
– Each of the models were run independantly in SAPHRE 8
– Each model was then subjected to 50,000 Monte Carlo trials with identical seed values
– Data Correlation for each type of component was performed in SAPHRE 8
– Predicted failure data model uses data derived from MIL-HDBK-217F (point estimates)
– Demonstrated failure data model uses data obtained from Quanterion Automated 
Databook version 4.2.1 (EPRD-2014) (mean values from data sets)
– Calculation of risk and uncertainty for each model type
• Predicted failure data uses epistemic uncertainty (Error Factor) values
• Demonstrated data use the following formula for uncertainty (Error Factor) 
𝐸𝐹 = 𝑒1.645 ln(1 + (  𝜎𝑙𝑛 𝜇𝑙𝑛)
2)
Epistemic Data Source Classification Approach
Source 
Source 
Description
Source 
Application
Error 
Factor
New Hardware MIL-HDBK-217F
Same Component 8
Like Component 9
Predicted Component Models
– Component Models
• MIL-HDBK-217F Model - uses stress method, Quality factors are those of the highest level for the 
specific part analyzed.  Temperatures, where applicable, are baselined at 130 deg. C, stress loads, 
where applicable, are between 90 and 100%. Environment is Airborne Uninhabited Fighter (AUF). 
Example calculations are seen below.
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All Components
Failure 
Rate
MTTF
Digital Gate Array 2.47e-8 40,485,830
Diode (LF) 4.25e-7 2,350,012
Transistor 3.53e-7 2,829,562
Resistors (RCR) 1.42e-7 7,058,767
Capacitors (CCR) 1.37e-8 72,878,861
CMOS Digital Gate Array
λP= (C1πT+C2πE)πQ πL
C1 0.02 101 to 1000 gates
πT 1.1 130 deg. C
C2 0.0096 Glass Seal DIP 24 pins
πE 8 AUF
πQ 0.25 Class S
πL 1 Learn. Factor > 2 yrs
FPMH 0.0247
FR/hr 2.47E-08
MTTF 40,485,830
Capacitor - CCR 
λp=λb πT πC πV πSR πQ πE
λB 0.0099 CCR
πT 35 130c
πC 0.66 0.01μf
πV 2 0.6
πSR 1 N/A
πQ 0.001 D
πE 30 AUF
FPMH 0.0137214
FR/Hr 1.37E-08
MTTF 72,878,861
Demonstrated Component Models
– Component Models
• Demonstrated Model - This approach quantifies failure rates by using same components taken 
from the Quanterion Automated Databook using EPRD-2014, NPRD-2016, and where applicable 
FMD-2016.  The same components used in the predicted model are selected where several years 
of failure data was found. Adjustments for varying environments were adjusted to the AUF 
environment by using MIL-HDBK-338 adjustment factors. The mean values and standard 
deviations were calculated. Error factors were then calculated for each component type. An 
example calculation is seen below.
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Micro Circuit (Digital Gate Array)
Class S 
338 Conversions (AUC-AUF)
FPMH
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
MTBF
MTBF 
Conversion
Converted 
Failure Rate/Hr.
1.87 1.87E-06 534759 320856 3.12E-06
1.73 1.73E-06 578035 346821 2.88E-06
1.57 1.57E-06 636943 382166 2.61E-06
1.44 1.44E-06 694444 416667 2.40E-06
1.56 1.56E-06 641026 384615 2.60E-06
1.66 1.66E-06 602410 361446 2.76E-06
1.83 1.83E-06 546448 327869 3.05E-06
1.88 1.88E-06 531915 319149 3.13E-06
1.99 1.99E-06 502513 301508 3.31E-06
2.04 2.04E-06 490196 294118 3.40E-06
Component Types MEAN STD DEV EF
Digital Gate Array 2.93E-06 3.29E-07 4.61
Diodes 2.45E-06 1.44E-06 4.10
Transistor 9.38E-07 5.37E-07 4.09
Resistor 2.77E-06 2.52E-07 4.67
Capacitor 1.07E-06 1.14E-06 3.91
MEAN STD DEV EF
2.93E-06 3.29E-07 4.61
Predicted Circuit Model
– Predicted Circuit Model
• Predicted Circuit Model - This approach quantifies the model by utilizing the MIL-HDBK-217F 
component calculations for each part as decribed in the component models slides.  The fault tree 
was then constructed to represent a two of two scenario. Each of the models were set up the 
same and solved for a mission time of 15 minutes. Epistemic error factor of 8 was used in the 
model based on the values seen in the chart in slide3.
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Demonstrated Circuit Model
– Demonstrated Circuit Model
• Demonstrated Circuit Model - This approach quantifies failure rates by using same components 
taken from the Quanterion Automated Databook using EPRD-2014, NPRD-2016, and where 
applicable FMD-2016.  The same components are used in the predicted model and were selected 
where several years of failure data was found. Adjustments for varying environments were made  
to adjust to the AUF environment by using MIL-HDBK-338 adjustment factors. The mean values 
and standard deviations were calculated. Error factors were then calculated for each component 
type.
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System Uncertainty
• Uncertainty Types
– Aleatory (Inherent characteristic of the system)
– Epistemic (lack of knowledge) 
• Parameter uncertainty is measured by the spread of the distribution, which can be expressed as the bounds 
(e.g. 5th and 95th percentiles) of the probability distribution
• Failure rates are often modeled by the lognormal distribution
– Quantitatively, the error factor (EF) is a measure of the spread of uncertainty for the lognormal about 
the Median
– EF = 95th/Median
– System Uncertainties were modeled post processing by the method below
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Lognormal Probability Density Function
• Newly designed Launch vehicles are comprised of heritage, Commercial Off the shelf, Modified 
Off the shelf, and newly designed components. 
• Due to cost and time constraints many programs allow the use of predicted failure data in 
determining if requirements have been met.
– Predicted data is often overly optimistic in the values calculated
– Predicted data does not take into account manufacturing, assembly, installation and 
operational considerations, which are often the primary factors in determining the 
reliability of a component or circuit
– Reliability models are often developed from data from multiple sources:
• Component databases (NPRD, EPRD, NUCLARR, etc.) 
• Aerospace historical data
• Other industry historical data
• Piece part count or Stress method (MIL-HDBK-217F)
• Engineering judgment 
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Applicability of Data
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Results
• The table below demonstrates the difference between the predicted models mean values (i.e. risk) and the 
uncertainty about the distribution of each model type.
– Predicted risk is 11 times less that that of the demonstrated
– System uncertainty of the predicted is two times greater than that of the demonstrated systems 
uncertainty
– Risk assessments may be inacurate
– Aggregate risk may be greater than the actual risk due to a skewing of multiple risk sources
– Reliability models may misrepresent the actual risk due to mixed failure data
Model Type Risk (1/N)
System 
Uncertainty
Predicted 1/2,111,041 4.08
Demonstrated 1/196,657 2.3
• When assessing Risk one must take into consideration the factors which may be providing an inaccurate 
representation of the risk, which is now assumed due to incomplete data , mixed models, as well as overly 
optimistic failure data.
– Risk assessments may be inacurate
– Aggregate risk may be greater than the actual risk due to a skewing of multiple risk sources
– Reliability models may misrepresent the actual risk due to mixed failure data
Conclusion
• Using predicted failure data may provide incorrect data, which may misrepresent the actual 
risk.
– Data is overly optimistic
– Data does not take into account manufacturing, assembly, quality processes, and operations
– How applicable is the data 
– Applicability is a source of uncertainty
– Epistemic Uncertainty is usually as uncertain as the predicted data
– Data may mislead managers into accepting an unknown level of risk
• Using demonstrated failure data will provide a reasonable results and may be more 
representative of actual risk.
– More time and effort are required to seek out and find applicable data
– Environments must be evaluated and adjusted to the appropriate value
– Equal quality of components must be used in assessing risk
– Failure databases are difficult to find and validate
– The source of data must be documented for traceability
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Summary
• System design is constrained by Safety, Reliability, and Quality requirements as 
well as design standards. The purpose being to assure safety, which is generally 
related to quality of product, design, and testing. 
• These bounds are where the risks lie, and must be fully recognized, understood, 
minimized, and eventually accepted or redesigned to a level, which then meets 
acceptable risk. 
• The bounds over time become eroded by the acceptance of risk, and at some 
time, the aggregate risks may well exceed these bounds.
• This may result in a falsely perceived level of confidence, and allow a project to 
proceed to a state of potential disaster, which may result in a loss of life and 
physical property. 
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Questions?
POC: Glen (Spencer) Hatfield
Glen.S.Hatfield@nasa.gov
256-544-5874
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Backup Charts
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Diodes (Low freq) 
λP= λB πT πS πC πQ πE
λB 0.0034 GP analog
πT 5.4 130C
πS 0.77 .8<Vs<=.9
πC 1 metal bond
πQ 0.7 JANTXV
πE 43 AUF
FPMH 0.42552972
FR/Hr 4.25E-07
MTTF 2,350,012
Transistors LF, BIPOLAR
λp=λb πT πA πR πS πQ πE
λB 0.00074 NPN/PNP
πT 6.3 130c
πA 1.5 Linear Amp
πR 2.3 10W
πS 0.73 0.8<Vs≤0.9
πQ 0.7 JANTXV
πE 43 AUF
FPMH 0.353411535
FR/Hr 3.53E-07
MTTF 2,829,562
Resistors - RCR Fixed Composition ER
λp=λbπT πP πS πQ πE 
λB 0.0017 RCR Fixed
πT 7.6 130c (col1)
πP 2.5 10W
πS 3.4 0.9
πQ 0.03 S
πE 43 AUF
FPMH 0.1416678
FR/Hr 1.42E-07
MTTF 7,058,767
MIL-HDBK-217F Predictions 
Backup Charts (Contd.)
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EPRD/NPRD Demonstrated 
Diodes (Low Frequency)
JANTXV
MIL HDBK-338 Conversions (AUC-AUF)
FPMH Environment
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
MTBF
MTBF 
Conversion
Converted 
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
2.86 auf 2.86E-06 349650 349650 2.86E-06
2.6 auc 2.60E-06 384615 230769 4.33E-06
0.6 auc 6.00E-07 1666667 1000000 1.00E-06
1.8 auf 1.80E-06 555556 555556 1.80E-06
Transistors (Bipolar)
JANTXV
MIL HDBK-338 Conversions (AIF-AUF)
FPMH
Environmen
t
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
MTBF
MTBF 
Conversion
Converted 
Failure Rate/Hr.
0.71 aif 7.10E-07 1408451 563380 1.77E-06
0.99 auf 9.90E-07 1010101 1010101 9.90E-07
0.87 auf 8.70E-07 1149425 1149425 8.70E-07
0.46 auc 4.60E-07 2173913 1304348 7.66E-07
0.29 auf 2.90E-07 3448276 3448276 2.90E-07
Resistor (RCR)
Class S
MIL HDBK-338 Conversions (ARW-AUF)
FPMH Environment
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
MTBF
MTBF 
Conversion
Converted 
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
0.539 arw 5.39E-07 1855288 371058 2.6950E-06
0.531 arw 5.31E-07 1883239 376648 2.6550E-06
0.560 arw 5.60E-07 1785714 357143 2.8000E-06
0.527 arw 5.27E-07 1897533 379507 2.6350E-06
0.539 arw 5.39E-07 1855288 371058 2.6950E-06
0.581 arw 5.81E-07 1721170 344234 2.9050E-06
0.677 arw 6.77E-07 1477105 295421 3.3850E-06
Capacitor CCR
Class D
MIL HDBK-338 Conversions (GB-AUF)
FPMH Environment
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
MTBF
MTBF 
Conversio
n
Converted 
Failure 
Rate/Hr.
0.109 auf 1.09E-07 9174312 9174312 1.0900E-07
2.41 auf 2.41E-06 414937.8 414938 2.4100E-06
0.164 gb 1.64E-07 6097561 609756 1.6400E-06
0.012 gb 1.20E-08 83333333 8333333 1.2000E-07
Mean STD DEV EF
2.49E-06 1.44E-06 4.10
Mean STD DEV EF
9.38E-07 5.37E-07 4.09
Mean STD DEV EF
2.77E-06 2.52E-07 4.67
Mean STD DEV EF
1.07E-06 1.15E-06 3.91
Data Source Application Classification
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Source Category Source Descrption Source Application
Source 
Application   
Error Factor
Same component 3
Like component 4
Same component 5
Like component 6
Same component 6
Like component 7
Same component 8
Like component 9
Documented Process 10
Undocumented Process 15
Legacy 
Hardware
A
Other Launch Vehicle Data                         
(Most Applicable)
B Aerospace Data
C
Note: This table is intended to be used for point estimates that lack distribution data. Use the distribution for uncertainty if it is known
Other Industry Data
New 
Hardware
D MIL-HDBK-217F Methods
E
Non-expert Engineering Judgment                                                                  
(Least Applicable)
